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CDSN COVID Response Recommendations and Future Directions 

On April 27th, members of the Canadian Defence and Security Network, along with participants from MINDS-funded networks (SPNET, DSF, NAADSN) met online to develop preliminary answers to questions we received from the MINDS program at the Department of National Defence as well as questions we developed. The questions largely fit into the five themes of the CDSN: Operations, Security, Personnel, Procurement, and Civil-Military Relations. Below, we briefly present the responses which represent a consensus (not every individual or organization agreed to every single response). The CDSN will develop fuller discussions over the next few months, but the urgency of the crisis compels us to release our recommendations and questions as soon as we can.   

Before discussing each group鈥檚 findings, one common theme emerged from each group鈥檚 discussion: The government ought to consider a new Defence Policy Review as many of the assumptions of the previous one have shifted. Many group findings overlapped with other groups. 

Operations 

What role is there for the CAF to support Canada during and after the pandemic? COVID 19 is expected to change the nature of conflict in the following ways: 

• Borders are expected to matter more (both domestic and international)
• Authoritarian regimes will both harden and may be more financially vulnerable
• Revisionist powers are likely to engage in more disinformation operations
• New adversaries may emerge especially as US leadership/priorities are uncertain
• Allied priorities may change
• The pandemic can be used as an asymmetric weapon
• Poor humanitarian conditions will amplify existing tensions leading to more refugees and internally displaced peoples

GOC should survey the nature and rationale for allied responses to COVID and new defence and security priorities. These discussions must inform the return to a new 鈥渘ormal鈥� operational stance. 

Security

How has COVID-19 changed the geopolitical landscape? What are the likely short-term impacts of the pandemic on international relations, defence and security?

• Gives hostile players鈥擱ussia, China, Iran, etc鈥攁dditional leverage in their regions with more fodder for cyber/hybrid efforts.
• Create openings for cooperation and institutional adaptation of the WHO where Canada can offer leadership & promote civil-mil expertise development for pandemic collaboration.
• Human security dialogue shifting 鈥� a non-military threat is creating great harm. Global and national level social inequalities will be exacerbated by the crisis, given that women, minorities and poorer individuals appear to be among the most affected.
• Globalization threatened as local production of PPE, vaccines, treatment become imperative.

If deployment is increasingly 鈥榣ocal鈥� how might this impact the relationships that CAF has with other 鈥榮ecurity providers鈥�, such as local police, academics, the public, health officials, etc. 

• There should be a standing committee or task force for dealing with CAF deployments in Canada so that provinces, federal departments, and other relevant actors have familiarity with CAF capabilities and procedures and for the CAF to have similar understanding of its partners with a Deputy Minister responsible for reporting to the Prime Minister.  Canada might want to consider developing a FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency] type organization within Public Safety or create a new agency entirely or resurrect the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

Personnel

How does Op Laser impact preparedness and readiness? Do we need to think of an increased role for the reserves as we think of potential future pandemics? How is Op Laser impacting the willingness to deploy of both the reg force and reserves?

• The reg force and reserves are impacted differently. One key consideration here is the lack of job security reservists might have in their day job & how that impact deployability.
• Deployments during pandemic creates additional stressors on military families as usual resources are not available, plus kids are not in school. It is harder to deploy when your own family is not safe and secure and is exacerbated for dual-military couples.
• Reservations were expressed about the CAF stepping into eldercare. This drains the CAF of its own healthcare capability and is not a sustainable solution.

Procurement

What are the assumptions for 10% or 20% reductions in the defence budget? Particularly in terms of the timing and process involved in either set of cuts?  

• Govt may allow departments to identify potential cuts or it may freeze spending and ask departments to find savings. Unclear whether/how cuts may play out.
• Avoid equal misery. Some parts of the CAF will have to be cut further than others, cutting proportionately leads to significant inefficiencies.
• Focus on outputs and enterprise level optimization as a means to generate efficiency and savings.

How can DND/CAF help to grow the economy following COVID-19?

• As demand was cut by order of government, there is no need to stimulate economy.
• If stimulus is desired, spending on the CAF is not the best tool.  Focus should be on lump sum payments to low income earners and infrastructure investments.

Civil-Military Relations

How can the CAF work more closely with other government departments and agencies, civil society organizations, and the communities in which they serve to prepare for and prevent the spread of infectious disease?

• Develop and disseminate Principles of Involvement that define what the CAF can and cannot do in Canada during the pandemic, both in terms of capability and legal restrictions, akin to rules of engagement but unclassified.
• This is a rare opportunity to demonstrate the work of CAF members to other Canadians.  Doing it well may help in the post-COVID budget fight and boost recruitment.

How can the DND/CAF further leverage social/digital applications for flat (vs. hierarchal) communications?

• Develop a better capacity for virtual collaboration. Consider reforming security classification so that more work can be done over unclassified systems.
• The digital space is more than just a domain for cyber conflict with the pandemic revealing much confusion about not just how to analyze the data but whether the data is good. Need to recruit and train people with data analytics capabilities.
• Assess online training resources being used while much of DND/CAF is staying at home, to determine which ones work best, which features/designs get more engagement.
• No consensus on whether it is CAF鈥檚 responsibility to defend Canadian 鈥渃ognitive鈥� sovereignty.  Who should be fighting against foreign disinformation campaigns aimed at public? More clarity needed from gov鈥檛 about CAF鈥檚 role in disinformation fight.

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COVID - Recommandations de r茅ponse du CDSN et orientations futures 

Les membres du R茅seau canadien de la d茅fense et de s茅curit茅, ainsi que les participants des r茅seaux de recherches(SPNET, DSFG, RDSNAA) financ茅s par le programme Mobilisation des id茅es nouvelles en mati猫re de d茅fense et de s茅curit茅 (MINDS) du D茅partement du la d茅fense national (MDN) se sont rencontr茅s virtuellement le 27 avril, 2020 pour discuter des questions que nous avons re莽ues du Minist猫re ainsi qu鈥檃ux questions que nous avons propos茅es. Les questions s鈥檌nspirent en grande partie des cinq th猫mes du R茅seau canadien de la d茅fense et de s茅curit茅 (RCDS): Op茅rations, S茅curit茅, Personnel, Approvisionnement et Relations civilo-militaires. Ci-dessous, nous pr茅sentons bri猫vement les r茅ponses qui repr茅sentent une partie et non pas l鈥檈nsemble de la discussion. Le RCDS entamera des discussions plus approfondies au cours des prochains mois, mais l鈥檜rgence de la crise nous oblige 脿 publier nos recommandations et nos questions d猫s que possible.   

Nous avons partag茅, ci-dessous, les grandes lignes qui ont encadr茅s nos discussions. A priori, les participants 茅taient tous d鈥檃ccord que le MDN dans les circonstances actuelles devrait consid茅rer un nouvel Examen de la politique de d茅fense pour renforcer les capacit茅s des Forces arm茅es canadiennes canadiennes (FAC) en tenant compte des r茅alit茅s de la pand茅mie de la COVID-19, ce que le dernier Examen n鈥檃vait pas pu consid茅r茅 quand il a 茅t茅 r茅diger.  

翱辫茅谤补迟颈辞苍蝉&苍产蝉辫;

What role is there for the CAF to support Canada during and after the pandemic? Le COVID 19 changera la nature des conflits de la mani猫re suivante: 

• Les fronti猫res auront plus d鈥檌mportance.
• Les r茅gimes autoritaires vont 脿 la fois se durcir et 锚tre plus vuln茅rables financi猫rement
• Les pouvoirs r茅visionnistes seront plus susceptibles de s'engager dans davantage d'op茅rations de d茅sinformation
• De nouveaux adversaires pourraient 茅merger
• Les priorit茅s de nos alli茅es vont changer
• La pand茅mie peut 锚tre utilis茅e comme arme asym茅trique
•  Les mauvaises conditions humanitaires amplifieront les tensions existantes, ce qui entra卯nera un plus grand nombre de r茅fugi茅s et de personnes d茅plac茅es.

Le gouvernement du Canada devrait 茅tudier la nature et la justification des r茅ponses des alli茅s au COVID et les nouvelles priorit茅s en mati猫re de d茅fense et de s茅curit茅. Ces discussions doivent 茅clairer le retour 脿 une nouvelle position op茅rationnelle 芦 normale 禄. 

厂茅肠耻谤颈迟茅&苍产蝉辫;

How has COVID-19 changed the geopolitical landscape? What are the likely short-term impacts of the pandemic on international relations, defence and security? 

• Les pays autoritaires comme la Russie, Chine, et l鈥橧ran, etc. pourraient exploiter la pand茅mie comme levier suppl茅mentaire dans leurs r茅gions, notamment pour amplifier leurs efforts cybern茅tiques /hybrides.
• La pand茅mie pourrait entam茅 des r茅formes au seins des ONG comme l鈥橭MS. Le Canada peut offrir du leadership et promouvoir le d茅veloppement d鈥檜ne expertise militaire civile pour la collaboration en cas de pand茅mie.
• Les in茅galit茅s sociales aux niveaux mondial et national seront exacerb茅es par la crise, 茅tant donn茅 que les femmes, les minorit茅s et les personnes les plus d茅munies semblent 锚tre parmi les plus touch茅es. La pand茅mie est une occasion pour une conversation sur la s茅curit茅 humaine.
• Avec les r茅percussions de la pand茅mie (manque de production de d鈥橢PI, m茅dicaments, par exemple), la mondialisation va 锚tre mis en question.

If deployment is increasingly 鈥榣ocal鈥� how might this impact the relationships that CAF has with other 鈥榮ecurity providers鈥�, such as local police, academics, the public, health officials, etc.

• Il devrait y avoir un comit茅 permanent ou un groupe de travail pour s鈥檕ccuper des d茅ploiements des FAC au Canada afin que les provinces, les minist猫res f茅d茅raux et les autres intervenants concern茅s connaissent bien les capacit茅s et les proc茅dures des FAC, et les FAC aient une compr茅hension similaire de leurs partenaires avec un sous-ministre responsable qui se rel猫ve directement au Premier ministre.  Le Canada pourrait 茅galement envisager de cr茅er une organisation du type FEMA (Agence f茅d茅rale de gestion des urgences) au sein de S茅curit茅 publique Canada ou cr茅er une nouvelle agence enti猫rement ou sous le parrainage de la S茅curit茅 publique et la Protection civile.

Personnel

How does Op Laser impact preparedness and readiness? Do we need to think of an increased role for the reserves as we think of potential future pandemics? How is Op Laser impacting the willingness to deploy of both the reg force and reserves?

• Les forces r茅guli猫res et les r茅serves sont touch茅es diff茅remment. Les r茅servistes craignaient souvent qu鈥檌ls\elles vont perdre leurs emplois s鈥檌ls/elles prennent un cong茅 sans solde pour qu鈥檌ls/elles puissent d茅ployer.
• Les d茅ploiements pendant une pand茅mie cr茅ent un stress suppl茅mentaire pour les familles des FACs. Les parents doivent contenter avec la scolarisation 脿 la maison, les garderies qui sont ferm茅es, etc. Ce stresse se multiplient si les familles ont deux parents dans les FACs, et s鈥檌ls n鈥檕nt pas de recours 脿 la famille 茅tendue (grands-parents, par exemple) pour des raisons de distanciation sociale.
• Des doutes ont 茅t茅 exprim茅s au sujet de la participation des FAC aux soins aux a卯n茅s. Cela prive les FAC de leur propre capacit茅 de soins de sant茅 et n鈥檈st pas une solution 脿 long terme.

Relations civilo-militaires

How can the CAF work more closely with other government departments and agencies, civil society organizations, and the communities in which they serve to prepare for and prevent the spread of infectious disease? 

• 脡laborer et diffuser des principes de participation qui d茅finissent ce que les FAC peuvent et ne peuvent pas faire au Canada pendant la pand茅mie - le plan des capacit茅s ainsi que des restrictions juridiques, comme les r猫gles d鈥檈ngagement, mais non classifie.
• La FAC dans nos communaut茅s une occasion de d茅montrer le travail et le r么le des membres des FACs 脿 d鈥檃utres Canadiens.  Si la FAC peut d茅montrer ce qu鈥檌ls font dans les fronti猫res Canadiennes, ceci va leur aider post-COVID 19 脿 r茅sister des coupures budg茅taires.

How can the DND/CAF further leverage social media/digital applications for flat (vs hierarchal) communications? 

• D茅velopper une meilleure capacit茅 de collaboration virtuelle.  Envisager de r茅former la classification de s茅curit茅 afin qu鈥檌l soit possible de faire plus de travail sur les syst猫mes non classifi茅s.
• L鈥檈space num茅rique est plus qu鈥檜n simple domaine de cyber-conflit avec la pand茅mie r茅v茅lant beaucoup de confusion sur la fa莽on non seulement d鈥檃nalyser les donn茅es, mais si les donn茅es sont bonnes.  Besoin de recruter et de former des personnes ayant des capacit茅s d鈥檃nalyse de donn茅es.
• 脡valuer les ressources de formation en ligne utilis茅es pendant qu鈥檜ne grande partie du MDN et des FAC reste 脿 la maison, afin de d茅terminer celles qui fonctionnent le mieux, les caract茅ristiques et les conceptions qui suscitent un plus grand engagement.
• Il n鈥檡 a pas de consensus sur la responsabilit茅 des FAC de d茅fendre la souverainet茅 芦 cognitive 禄 du Canada.  Qui devrait lutter contre les campagnes de d茅sinformation 茅trang猫res destin茅es au public?  Il faut plus de clart茅s de la part du gouvernement au sujet du r么le des FAC dans la lutte contre la d茅sinformation.